The recent attacks on Iran's nuclear facilities by Israel and the USA, including the strategically important sites of Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan, have put the international community on high alert. US President Donald Trump declared on June 22, 2025, that the facilities were "completely destroyed." However, despite these massive military strikes, concerns remain that Iran could develop nuclear weapons in a short period even without functioning nuclear facilities. This report sheds light on the reasons why Iran remains a nuclear threat despite destroyed infrastructure, drawing on concrete facts and analyses.
Iran's Advanced Technical Capabilities
A key reason for Iran's ability to quickly develop nuclear weapons lies in its already acquired technical know-how. Since the 1980s, Iran has built a comprehensive nuclear program, which, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), also included the secret AMAD project for the development of nuclear warheads until 2003. Although this program was officially discontinued, Iran has systematically expanded its knowledge of uranium enrichment, warhead design, and missile technology. Experts like Georg Steinhauser, Professor of Radiochemistry at the Technical University of Vienna, emphasize that technical expertise, particularly for producing weapons-grade uranium, cannot be destroyed by airstrikes.
Iran possesses the knowledge to enrich uranium from 60% to the 90% purity required for nuclear weapons – a process that, according to Steinhauser, is "just a stone's throw away." Before the attacks in June 2025, Iran had accumulated approximately 409 kilograms of uranium with 60% purity, enough for about ten nuclear weapons with further enrichment, according to IAEA reports. A preliminary US intelligence report, cited by The New York Times, suggests that a significant portion of this material was moved to secret locations before the attacks. This indicates that Iran continues to possess the critical raw material to build a bomb, even if the major facilities are destroyed.
Relocation to Secret Sites
The destruction of known nuclear facilities such as Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan has weakened Iran's visible infrastructure, but the country has been investing in secret and decentralized facilities for years. The facility in Parchin, about 30 kilometers south of Tehran, was identified in October 2024 during an Israeli attack as a secret research site for nuclear weapons. Such sites are often difficult to locate and can be used for smaller but effective enrichment processes. According to a New York Times report from June 2025, the US attacks may not have substantially destroyed the underground structures of Fordo, as the facility is located deep within a mountain massif.
Iran also has experience in relocating sensitive activities. In the past, following sabotage acts such as the 2010 Stuxnet cyberattack, centrifuges were quickly moved to other locations. The IAEA reported in February 2023 that Iran made unannounced changes to centrifuges in Fordo, underscoring the program's flexibility. This ability to move production capacity to secret locations makes it difficult to permanently eliminate Iran's nuclear potential through airstrikes.
Advances in warhead design and delivery systems
A nuclear weapon requires not only enriched uranium but also a functional warhead design and a delivery system. Iran has made significant progress in both areas. According to an X post from June 21, 2025, a secret intelligence document allegedly proves that Iran was close to developing a deployable nuclear warhead. While such information should be treated with caution, it supports reports from Western intelligence agencies that attribute to Iran the capability to construct a simple "gun-type" design. This relatively simple design requires less technical effort and, according to experts, could be implemented within a few months.
In the area of delivery systems, Iran possesses a sophisticated missile program. The "Shahab" and "Sejil" missiles can transport warheads over long distances, and the explosion at a missile test site in 2011 demonstrated the intensity of these developments. Even if the major nuclear facilities are destroyed, Iran's missile infrastructure largely remains intact, ensuring the delivery capability of a potential weapon.
Political motivation and strategic deterrence
Iran's political leadership views the nuclear program as a means of strategic deterrence, particularly in light of threats from Israel and the United States. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei stated on June 4, 2025, that uranium enrichment is essential for the country's independence. Recent attacks may further strengthen this resolve. Political scientist Azadeh Zamirirad argues that an escalating conflict could drive Iran to compensate for its nuclear potential by building nuclear weapons.
The relativization of a 2005 fatwa prohibiting nuclear weapons fuels speculation about a covert program. An X post from June 24, 2025, suggests that following the attacks, Iran might withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and cease cooperation with the IAEA, further complicating international monitoring. This political dynamic increases the likelihood that Iran will mobilize its resources to quickly build a bomb.
Problems and limitations
Despite these capabilities, there are hurdles. The production of a functional atomic weapon requires precise explosive lenses and fast electronics, technologies that, according to Steinhauser himself, are difficult for experts to access. Furthermore, international sanctions and intelligence operations could make it difficult to procure these components. Nevertheless, the threshold for the bomb is low, according to experts like Ulrich Schlie, as Iran already possesses most of the necessary components.
Conclusion: A threat beyond the facilities
The destruction of Iran's nuclear facilities has not significantly weakened the country. With existing enriched uranium, technical know-how, secret sites, and a robust missile program, Iran remains capable of developing an atomic weapon within a few months. The political motivation to secure regional power through nuclear deterrence intensifies this danger. Military strikes can delay the program, but as Jan Busse from the University of the Bundeswehr emphasizes, a long-term solution is only possible politically. Without a new nuclear deal, Iran threatens to cross the threshold to nuclear power faster than the international community can react.
