Just a few days ago, on May 5, 2026, the Mainz-based biotechnology company BioNTech announced the closure of almost all of its German production sites. The plants in Idar-Oberstein and Marburg, the sites of competitor CureVac (acquired in 2025) in Tübingen and Wiesbaden, as well as the facility in Singapore, are to be largely or completely shut down by the end of 2027. Up to 1,860 jobs are affected – about a quarter of the workforce. The production of the Corona vaccine Comirnaty will be completely relocated to the US partner Pfizer. In Germany, only the headquarters in Mainz and purely office-based locations in Berlin and Munich will remain. The company expects annual savings of up to 500 million euros from 2029 onwards. Founders Uğur Şahin and Özlem Türeci will leave the company at the end of 2026 to found a new mRNA venture, in which BioNTech will hold a minority stake.
This is not an operational accident. This is the logical conclusion of an era in which a company, with state support and public multi-billion euro contracts, rose to become a global vaccine giant – and is now, with the acute crisis over, dropping its German sites like a hot potato. In the pandemic, BioNTech proved what mRNA technology can achieve. The criticism here is not directed against the science. It is directed against a business model that utilized public funds and emergency contracts without providing comparable counter-services in the form of site or job guarantees. It is directed against a policy that was once again fooled. And it is directed against the predatory knight mentality of a corporation that profited from the hardship of many and is now leaving the bill to the regions and taxpayers.
The rise: From cancer research to pandemic rescue – with public money
BioNTech was founded in 2008 by Uğur Şahin and Özlem Türeci, both oncologists of Turkish origin. The core business was the development of personalized mRNA cancer vaccines. Until 2019, the company was a typical biotech player with losses and research expenses amounting to hundreds of millions of euros. Then came COVID-19. Within a few months, BioNTech, in cooperation with Pfizer, developed the mRNA vaccine BNT162b2 (Comirnaty), which was one of the first worldwide to be approved.
The success was not solely privately financed. In September 2020, BioNTech received funding of up to 375 million euros from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) to accelerate vaccine development and expand production capacities in Germany. The money was explicitly intended for building manufacturing capacities in this country. BioNTech bought the Novartis plant in Marburg and expanded it into one of Europe's largest mRNA production facilities. A pandemic preparedness contract with the Federal Ministry of Health followed later.
The German government and the EU Commission saw BioNTech not just as a vaccine manufacturer, but as a symbol of German innovative strength. The founders were celebrated as heroes, received awards, and were photographed with them in public. But even then, the crucial clauses were missing: binding site guarantees, long-term employment commitments, or repayment obligations in case of premature closure of the sites.
The golden deals: Pfizergate, secret contracts, and liability waivers
The real jackpot came through the European Union. Under the leadership of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the EU concluded a framework agreement with Pfizer/BioNTech in spring 2021 for up to 1.8 billion doses – a volume of an estimated 35 billion euros. Negotiations were partly conducted via personal text messages between von der Leyen and Pfizer CEO Albert Bourla. These messages were never officially archived and are still not fully public today. Several court rulings by the EU Court of Justice (e.g., 2024 and 2025) criticized the Commission's lack of transparency. The New York Times and other media fought legally for their release – with partial success. The contracts themselves were only published heavily redacted. Commercial secrets were used as justification.
Particularly explosive: The manufacturers were largely exempted from liability risks in the contracts. The EU member states essentially took responsibility for possible side effects – an emergency measure that was understandable during the pandemic, but remained without adequate consideration in the form of price controls or production commitments. BioNTech and Pfizer could deliver whatever they wanted and benefited from billions in advance payments.
Germany additionally ordered its own contingents. Here too, there were no publicly verifiable guarantees for the preservation of the sites funded with taxpayers' money. Politicians relied on the companies' word of honor. A classic case of "too big to fail" – except that the company now decides for itself where it lets it "fail."
The profits: billions for the company, billions for the founders
The numbers speak for themselves. In 2021, BioNTech achieved a turnover of around 19 billion euros and a net profit of 10.3 billion euros – almost exclusively from the Corona vaccine. Further high profits followed in 2022 (around 9.4 billion euros). In total, tens of billions flowed to BioNTech/Pfizer during the pandemic years. U?ur ?ahin, who holds about 17 percent of the shares, became a billionaire. His fortune was temporarily estimated at over 12 billion US dollars; Özlem Türeci also benefited enormously. The family has since been among the richest in Germany.
At the same time, BioNTech did pay high trade taxes (Marburg alone received over a billion euros in the years 2021–2023), but the net effect for the state was negative: subsidies plus secret contracts plus assumption of liability resulted in a massive redistribution of taxpayer money to private shareholders. The founders cashed in, the public bore the risk.
The cancer narrative: Big promises, no breakthroughs yet
After the vaccine boom, BioNTech deliberately fueled the narrative that mRNA technology would now rapidly deliver breakthroughs in cancer vaccines. "Personalized cancer medicine" became the new mantra. The pipeline is impressive: several candidates in Phase 2/3, including BNT113 against HPV-associated head and neck tumors, BNT116 against lung cancer, and other pan-tumor approaches like Pumitamig (BNT327). The company invested over 2 billion euros in oncology R&D alone in 2025. First approval applications are targeted for 2026, with data from seven late-stage studies expected in 2026.
Nevertheless, to date, there is no approved mRNA cancer therapy from BioNTech on the market. The clinical results are encouraging, but not yet revolutionary. The company has been recording losses since 2024 (around 670–700 million euros in 2024, similar in 2025) because Corona revenues have collapsed and oncology investments continue. With 17 billion euros in cash reserves, BioNTech can afford this. However, the message to investors and politicians has been for years: "Breakthroughs in cancer soon." The reality is a lengthy, expensive pipeline – typical for biotech, but far from the hype of the post-pandemic years.
The great culling: German sites are being disposed of
Now the consequence. The overcapacities from the pandemic are here. Demand for corona vaccines has collapsed. Instead of using the German plants, expanded with public funds, for oncology production or converting them, BioNTech is shifting the remaining COVID production entirely to Pfizer in the USA. The former CureVac sites, which BioNTech had recently taken over, are also being closed. The affected regions – Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, Baden-Württemberg – feel betrayed. Marburg's mayor Thomas Spies spoke of "outrageous" and recalled that the profits from the pandemic phase were "ultimately financed by taxpayers' money."
BioNTech argues from a business perspective: reduce overcapacities, cut costs, focus on oncology. That is legitimate for a publicly traded company. But it is also proof that politicians did not demand any counter-performance. No clause that tied the preservation of German production to subsidies or contracts. No obligation to secure jobs in case of success. The predatory knights used the castles (sites) as long as it was profitable – and are now moving on.
Political failure: Once again, no conditions
Germany and the EU acted correctly in the pandemic by prioritizing vaccines. The mistake was in the naivety afterwards. Billions of contracts were awarded without transparency, without liability risks for the manufacturers, and without strategic safeguarding of the domestic location. The contracts remain secret in essential parts to this day. The SMS affair involving von der Leyen shows how personal networks and lack of transparency undermined public control. Courts repeatedly had to call the Commission to order.
This is not an isolated case. It is a pattern: in crises, money is handed out freely; in the aftermath, the courage for accountability is lacking. The Greens and the traffic light government, but also previous federal governments, celebrated BioNTech as a German success – and allowed the company to now reap the rewards while leaving the risks to the taxpayers.
Consequences for Germany as a location
The closures affect not only 1,860 families. They affect trust in German industrial policy. How can we promote biotech start-ups in the future if even the most successful case shows that subsidies and contracts do not create long-term commitment? How can we convince citizens of the necessity of public investment in key technologies if profits are privatized and the sites are later disposed of?
BioNTech delivered a life-saving vaccine to the world. The scientists deserve respect for that. The criticism is directed at the system: a capitalism that exploits crises without taking responsibility, and a politics that is content with symbolism instead of hard contracts.
The robber barons have left their castles. The question remains: Who will build the next ones, and under what conditions? The federal government, the states, and the EU Commission are now called upon to demand accountability, establish transparency, and create clear rules for future crises: anyone who accepts public funds and enters into state contracts must also commit to Germany as a location in the long term – or repay the money.
It is time for a real industrial policy turnaround. Otherwise, all that will remain in the end are the empty halls in Marburg, Idar-Oberstein, and Tübingen – and the memory of a pandemic in which some became very rich while others paid the bill.
